On the Jiksan Gold Mine in Korea (Translation)
An account of the exploration of Joseon by Tsuneto Noritaka (恒藤規隆), Japan’s first doctor of agriculture, the founder of Japanese soil science, and an explorer. At the time, the Korean Empire (Joseon) was effectively a lawless land, something even the Japanese could not help but lament. Even the predatory treaties with foreign powers were only concluded after those powers had, through the use of force, secured their actual concessions in practice. Amid rampant corruption and intrigue that sold off the country, government agencies were preoccupied with nothing but evading responsibility. In the midst of all this, it is striking how the power of provincial magnates was so formidable that even Japan feared them.
On the Jiksan Gold Mine in Korea
Journal of Geography (Chigaku Zasshi), Vol. 13, No. 6
Tsuneto Noritaka (恒藤規隆)
June 15, 1901
Today I have been given the opportunity to speak about Joseon’s Jiksan gold mine. However, I have caught a cold over the past few days and my throat is in rather poor condition, so today I will give only a rough account and ask for your understanding.
Regarding Joseon, I gave a lecture before this society once, around the day before yesterday, I believe. At that time I spoke about the geology of Joseon in general terms and scarcely touched on the mines. The reason was that the purpose of surveying the mines had not yet been accomplished, and I judged that bringing up the subject of the mines might hinder the carrying out of that purpose.
This time, however, since that purpose has already been achieved, I thought there would be no problem in speaking about the mines. So today I intend to speak in particular about the Jiksan gold mine.
The purpose of my going to Joseon was to determine whether developing any particular mine in Joseon would be commercially viable. That is to say, I went to investigate whether it would be good or bad to actually carry out a mining operation.
The mines of Joseon resemble Japan’s mining administration. To investigate which mine in Joseon is promising is, just like searching for which mine is promising in Japan, truly as vague a task as groping about in a fog.
For example, even just asking which of the coal mines in Kyushu, Japan, is promising is extremely ambiguous. And to go and see for oneself which mine is promising across the vast territory of Joseon is a very foolish undertaking. Since in the end nothing can be learned that way, I decided to look only at a few famous mines that generally enjoyed a good reputation in Joseon.
For example, to put it in Japanese terms, I selected mines that had long been famous, such as the Ikuno silver mine or the Sado gold mine. In this way, the following four locations were considered the most promising:
1. The Jaeryeong iron mine in Hwanghae Province
2. The Eunsan gold mine near Wonsan in Pyeongan Province
3. The Gapsan copper mine in Hamgyeong Province
4. The Yongdam gold mine in Gyeongsang Province
Because these four locations had a reputation for being promising within Joseon, I set out for Joseon intending to survey these mines and judge whether or not they were commercially viable.
However, the survey period was a mere three months. To see all four of these mines within three months, one cannot stay long in any one place. Moreover, these mines were scattered across the southern and northern extremities of Joseon, so the travel time was also considerable. Among them, they were located in especially rugged and remote regions, so in practice I could stay only one or two days at each mine.
To judge the commercial viability of a mine within one or two days is, by its nature, an extremely difficult thing. But there was no choice, so I surveyed in that manner and returned home for the time being.
Last year, after seeing these four mines and returning, I gave a lecture on the geology I had observed along the way, and its outline was also published in the “Journal of Geography.” At the time I visited those four locations, a British engineer happened to be at the Eunsan gold mine inspecting the site. And there was a rumor that Britain was demanding this mine. There was also talk going around that, if Britain had already laid hands on it, it would be useless for Japan to demand it belatedly.
Also, since the route happened to be convenient, the Joseon government requested that I also survey the Yeongheung gold mine near Wonsan. The request was, “If that mine is judged to be good, we would like Japan to develop it.”
Moreover, while I was staying in Gyeongseong (Seoul) at the time, the Japanese minister Mr. Hayashi (林) made the following request of me: “These days the Japanese are said to be mining gold at a place called Jiksan. Would you go and confirm in what manner they are mining and whether it is actually a mine with potential?” As it happened, I had the time and it seemed interesting, so we set out for Jiksan.
Upon arriving, it turned out to be a rather interesting place. But this was, after all, a visit made at the minister’s request, and I considered it to be outside the original purpose of our survey.
Afterward, having surveyed all four of the aforementioned mines, I returned home. After returning, I compared the results obtained from various directions.
First, the location judged to be most promising was the Eunyul iron mine near Jaeryeong. It is a quite interesting place. Next, the Jiksan gold mine, which I had visited earlier, was also a quite interesting target. The Eunsan gold mine has imposing terrain, but to develop it in earnest would require considerable capital. In particular, securing transportation would cost a great deal, so it is by no means an easy undertaking.
The Gapsan copper mine is located in a place where transportation is very inconvenient, and the Yongdam gold mine was small in scale and not very attractive. So in the end I concluded that the Eunyul iron mine and the Jiksan gold mine appeared most promising.
That said, this was no more than a tentative judgment to the extent of “appearing promising.” Afterward we carried out various follow-up investigations, including ore analysis, and the results turned out to confirm our predictions to a certain degree. So a discussion began: “Shall we actually try developing this?”
But I judged that the earlier survey had been very superficial. I thought it would be better to decide on whether to develop only after conducting a somewhat more thorough survey. This process, which you have probably seen in the newspapers and elsewhere, was carried out with the Shibusawa-Asano Mining Association as its principal body.
So I made a proposal to that association.
“After surveying both the iron mine and the gold mine once more, it would be good to develop whichever proves promising.”
In this way I went to Joseon again for a second survey. The purpose of the second survey was mainly to survey the gold mine, and then to look at the iron mine.
Just before departing for the second survey, around December of the year before last, a man named Sasaki Kiyomaro (佐々木清麿) applied to the Joseon government for five mines, through Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese minister resident in Joseon. This was, to some extent, an action taken in line with our intentions, but at the time it was based on Sasaki’s individual judgment, and at the level of the Shibusawa (澁澤)-Asano (淺野) Mining Association there was as yet no intention of making a formal application. The plan had been to judge whether to develop only after a thorough survey.
But around that time, rumors began to circulate that Russia was trying to take all of Joseon’s mines for itself, or that America was demanding those mines, and various international situations grew complicated. In the end, the Japanese side too came to apply for the mines in haste. The locations applied for at that time were precisely these five: Anseong, the Jiksan gold mine, and the Eunyul and Jaeryeong iron mines.
This was, in the end, because the result of my first survey—that, among the regions I had surveyed, the Eunyul iron mine and the Jiksan gold mine were judged to be the most promising—had become known to the world. But at the time these mines were applied for through the minister, the form of the application was, to be sure, more a matter of coincidence than of “because those places are promising.”
However, as this situation spread, the fact that we were paying attention to the Jiksan gold mine and the iron mine became known to the Japanese around Gyeongseong (Seoul), and accordingly a fierce competition broke out among the Japanese to stake their claims to the mines first.
That movement was, on the one hand, a movement to seize the Jiksan gold mine, and on the other hand, a movement to seize the iron mine. Whether that movement was actually aimed at developing the mines themselves is unknown. Perhaps the intention was to stake a claim before other Japanese could mine them, and then later resell them at a high price.
In any case, from that point on, vigorous activity broke out in various places.
So by the time I arrived in Joseon for the second survey, the rumor had already spread locally that “that man has come to seize the gold mine and the iron mine,” and accordingly my every action was under scrutiny. If I said even a little something like “this mine is good,” it would immediately turn into a rumor and spread, and it could become a great hindrance to the entire Japanese mine development plan.
In fact, for example, if the Japanese side showed any intention of demanding Jiksan, people who had already colluded with high-ranking officials of the Joseon government would move first and attempt to obstruct the Japanese side’s activities.
It was the same on the iron mine side. With respect to the iron mine as well, there were those who colluded with provincial officials or with officials of the Imperial Household Department (Gungnaebu) to carry out obstruction, and my every move was being watched. If I uttered even a single word like “this mine looks good,” it would immediately become valuable information to the other side and could, as a result, bring about obstruction.
For these reasons, I had a very difficult time throughout the second survey. I had no choice but to conceal it outwardly while cautiously surveying only the Jiksan gold mine.
Of course, that survey too was not a precise one, and because the time was so short it was difficult to produce in-depth results. But in any case I came to grasp the general potential, and so I arrived at the judgment, “Let us formally apply for this place.”
In the end, the five mines that Sasaki Kiyomaro had earlier applied for became, at this point, for the first time the formal demands of the Shibusawa-Asano Mining Association. Until then, the application had been made in Sasaki’s individual name and was not the official position of the Shibusawa side.
Now that the decision was made to demand the Jiksan gold mine, the position of the mining association and the prior fact of the application finally came together for the first time. And that application soon led to a formal demand through the Japanese minister.
After applying for the gold mine through the minister, in Japan’s case there is something called the “Mining Ordinance,” so to demand a mine one must go through various detailed procedures. In Joseon’s case, however, as you all know, there are no clear regulations, and matters are handled according to the situation at hand. Therefore it was a situation in which one had no idea how one was supposed to make a demand, or what procedures one was supposed to follow.
Before this, Britain had already concluded a kind of provisional treaty with the Joseon government and had received a promise that one mine in Joseon would be granted to it. Even around the time I went on the first survey, a British engineer was surveying a mine, and in the end, as a result, Britain came to demand the Eunsan gold mine.
But even though the British side formally requested it of the Joseon government, the Joseon government did not grant permission. At this the British minister was furious, and the parties concerned at the time judged that it could not be resolved through words, so they came to initiate armed action.
What they did was this: Britain hired more than 100 Japanese laborers, armed them, surrounded the mine with swords and other weapons, and prepared to fight against any response from the Joseon army.
The Joseon government was greatly enraged at this and, saying, “The British are truly insolent. To illegally enter a mine they were not even granted and carry out mining work!” dispatched troops to drive them out.
At this, Britain judged that it could retreat no further, and in the end, after applying military pressure, obtained the permission.
Such stories were also reported in the newspapers at the time, so you are no doubt well aware of them. Because of such circumstances, even matters already granted by treaty would not be carried out without such complicated shows of force—that was the reality of Joseon.
The Japanese side in particular was attempting to newly demand a gold mine without even such a treaty, so the diplomatic campaign to obtain this permission was an extremely difficult undertaking.
The procedural steps involved in applying for the gold mine were carried out entirely under the responsibility of Minister Hayashi, so we had no way of knowing exactly how he went about the procedures. However, as far as I could tell, it seems he made the request to the Joseon side along the following lines:
“If you granted permission to Germany, granted it to America, and granted it to Britain, then surely you ought to grant Japan one gold mine as well.”
But this request came with various difficulties.
The greatest problem among them was the internal infighting on the Japanese side. As I mentioned earlier, because infighting among the Japanese over staking claims to the gold mine was underway, once it became known that Shibusawa had laid hands on the Jiksan gold mine, attempts to get ahead of him began from various quarters.
Some people would offer money and goods, saying, “If you hand over the Jiksan gold mine to me, I will give you a large sum,” and there were even traces of some sums actually having been paid, and there were also those who attempted to negotiate by dangling profit as bait. It is presumed that there were such movements.
Our side tried as much as possible to obtain information and grasp the situation, but because it was a matter in Joseon, it could not easily be ascertained. However, judging from various circumstances, it is concluded that such backroom dealings or brokering attempts did in fact occur.
The Hayashi minister’s side continued to make the request with the consistent logic that Japan, too, ought to receive a gold-mine permit on equal terms with the great powers. To this the Joseon foreign minister could offer no particular counterargument.
But internally they continued to delay the permission, and finally Minister Hayashi came to request it by having an audience directly with the Joseon king.
The time I was in Joseon was March, and only around May did the Joseon government finally lean as follows:
“In any case, we cannot but grant at least one to Japan as well.”
And around June, the Joseon king is said to have handed down a royal command directly to Minister Hayashi that he would grant the gold-mine permission. At this our side too thought the permission would be issued at once.
We thought the permission would soon be issued, but in the meantime various obstacles arose. The greatest cause among them was, in the end, the struggle over authority within the Joseon government.
The point is this. If the foreign minister were to grant this gold mine to a Japanese, that could leave him open to the accusation that “the foreign minister acted for Japan’s benefit while sacrificing Joseon’s interests,” and in fact the foreign minister could find himself in danger of losing his position.
So the foreign minister said the following:
“The Jiksan gold mine falls under the jurisdiction of the Imperial Household Department, so this is a matter for the Minister of the Imperial Household to handle.”
In the end, evading his own responsibility, he shoved the handling of it onto the Minister of the Imperial Household.
But the problem was that the Minister of the Imperial Household also said,
“Granting permission or concluding a treaty is originally the authority of the foreign minister. My duty is no more than the procedure.”
That is, a situation arose in which each pushed the matter off, saying it was not within his own jurisdiction. For this reason, the permission issue began to be greatly delayed. As June turned to July, and July turned to August, the gold-mine permission was simply not being processed.
These problems all, in the end, originated from the struggles over power and responsibility in Gyeongseong (Seoul).
At the Jiksan gold mine, Japanese had already come and been running a gold-mining operation since a year earlier. But the Joseon miners who were there greatly feared the Japanese, and moreover hated the Japanese. As a result there had been several clashes between the Japanese and the Joseon miners, but they had not escalated into anything major.
However, when I arrived at the site in February, a large clash broke out. Two Japanese were injured, and an incident occurred in which about 2,000 Joseon miners rose up and drove out the Japanese. This matter blew up considerably, and the Japanese side came to file a claim for damages against the Joseon government. At this time I happened to be at the mine site.
For Japanese to work in a Joseon mine might appear to be lawless (the act of an outlaw), but within Joseon it was not so great a crime. The original story was something like this: a Japanese had lent money to a Joseon miner, and when he could not get the money back, he went into the mine and began mining gold.
This incident unfolded in a very complicated way, and at the time it was also a situation in which the Japanese side was formally demanding the Jiksan gold mine from the Joseon government. For this reason, the Jiksan mine was a place where various conflicts were concentrated.
That the situation would be difficult to resolve through simple diplomatic negotiation had already become clear from the British case. So while demanding damages, the mine side increased its Japanese manpower, brought in equipment and timber, and made a show of “we are going to carry out full-scale mining.” In reality they did not begin mining, but outwardly they behaved as if making preparations to mine.
In this situation, the Joseon government finally issued a withdrawal order. But the Japanese side refused it. The reason was that, although there had been damages from the earlier clash—Japanese injured and houses burned—the Joseon government had not provided compensation for these. The Japanese side said the following:
“As long as you do not pay damages, we will absolutely not withdraw from this place.”
And they resolutely refused the provincial official’s withdrawal order. The local Japanese said the following:
“We (the Japanese) would not be the least bit alarmed even if Joseon mobilized its military. If they were to send troops, we would rather welcome it.”
In the end, the Joseon government too became unable to do anything more.
Because Gyeongseong (Seoul) was pressuring the Joseon government by citing the precedents of various countries, the Joseon government finally arrived at the judgment that it had no choice but to grant permission to the Japanese.
Just at the moment when the Jiksan gold mine was about to be granted, the Bukcheong Incident (translator’s note: the Boxer Rebellion) broke out and Japanese troops headed for China. As rumors spread that a Japanese fleet was coming to Joseon, that a Japanese army headquarters would be established at Incheon, and that Japanese troops would land at Pyeongyang, Joseon was gripped by anxiety that the situation in which Japanese troops had rapidly entered during the past Sino-Japanese War might be repeated.
In the midst of all this, two Japanese warships, on their return from the Bukcheong Incident, put into port at Incheon, and immediately after Commander Togo (東郷, Togo Heihachiro) had an audience with the Joseon king, the permission for the Jiksan gold mine finally came down.
The formal signing of that permission (conclusion of the treaty) took place later, but within Joseon the reputation spread that Japan’s military prestige had influenced the granting of the gold-mine permission. The people of Joseon said:
“If Japan had not mobilized military force, Joseon’s mines would not have fallen into Japanese hands.”
There were even some who went so far as to say this, it is said. Of course, that is no more than common gossip.
And finally, on the ○th of the month (date unknown), the formal treaty was concluded (translator’s note: the date the Jiksan-gun Gold Mine Joint Treaty was concluded was August 16). That treaty used verbatim the same wording as when Britain was granted the Eunsan mine. This, then, is roughly the course by which the Jiksan gold mine came into Japanese hands.
This entire process was, of course, thanks to the behind-the-scenes efforts of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the legation, and the consulate, and we were involved only in part of it. We have no way of knowing how it proceeded overall, but as far as the portion in which I participated is concerned, the flow was roughly as described above.
As for the area of the mining district of the Jiksan gold mine, this too was modeled on Britain’s grant of the Eunsan gold mine, and was set at 6 ri in the east-west direction by the Japanese ri standard—that is, about 60 ri by the Joseon ri standard—and 4 ri in the north-south direction, about 40 ri by the Joseon ri standard (translator’s note: 1 Japanese ri equals 10 Joseon ri. Hereafter described in Japanese ri units). The boundaries were to be fixed later in consultation with the Joseon government.
From here on I will speak briefly about the location and the general appearance of the Jiksan gold mine.
This is a rough sketch of the Jiksan (稷山) gold mine (he points to the figure). The location of the Jiksan gold mine is at a point about 20 ri south of Gyeongseong (Seoul). A river flows here, and this river forms the boundary line between Gyeonggi Province and Chungcheong Province. Jiksan-gun corresponds to the northernmost part of Chungcheong Province.
The name “Jiksan” was first learned by the Japanese in connection with this gold mine. However, this area was already a well-known region even during the Sino-Japanese War.
The best-known example is the crossing point of the river that flows between Anseong and Jiksan—that is, “Anseong-naru” (Anseong Ferry)—which is famous as the place where Captain Matsuzaki was killed in action during the Sino-Japanese War. One ri from Anseong-naru lies Seonghwan Station, and this too belongs within Jiksan-gun.
“Seonghwan” and “Anseong-naru” were frequently mentioned during the Sino-Japanese War, but “Jiksan” was not so well known. This is because the Jiksan county office is located inland, away from the road, and so was not directly connected to the fighting.
Asan is also in this vicinity. Asan is about 5 ri from Seonghwan, and it is the region that became a battlefield at the time the Japanese army was advancing toward Asan. The place where the Jiksan county office stood was not directly connected to the fighting, which is why it was not well known.
Also, the sea area beside Asan is precisely the sea where the “Battle of Pungdo (豊島)” took place. Pungdo was probably located in this vicinity. To reach Jiksan by sea route, one must come south from Incheon, pass through the sea area north of Pungdo, and enter the river. Near this river mouth there is a wharf called Songpo (Sonbo, ソンボ)(translator’s note: Seongpo in Korean). From this Songpo to the Jiksan county office is about 3 ri, and to the place where the gold mine currently is, about 5 ri.
Anseong belongs to Gyeonggi Province, but it is the location of the largest market in the region south of Seoul, and it also serves as a collection and distribution point for freight. The mining district that was set this time is about 6 ri east-west and about 4 ri north-south, from Seonghwan to Anseong.
The east of Jiksan-gun borders Jincheon, and the south borders Mokcheon-gun. There is also a place name here called Cheonan, and this area is a very convenient region for transportation. Furthermore, the Gyeongbu Railway (京釜鐵道), which the Japanese are attempting to build, is planned to pass through this region.
The Gyeongin Line connects to Seoul, and a railway station is to be established at a point about 2 ri from Seoul. This railway will pass beside Anseong-naru, pass through Seonghwan Station, and connect toward the Asan direction.
This area produces a great deal of rice, even within Chungcheong Province. Another important place is Yesan (禮山), located near Asan. There is a large market here that trades rice and various grains, and many Japanese merchants purchase grain here.
Once the Gyeongbu Railway opens in the future, this place called Jiksan will become a very promising region in terms of both maritime and land transport. For a gold mine to be located in a place with such good transportation is a very rare thing.
Let me briefly explain the geological structure of this region. The entire area around the Jiksan gold mine is basically a gneiss (片麻岩) zone. Within it, granite (御影石) is distributed here and there.
Usually, when granite is embedded within gneiss, the granite often forms high mountains. For example, this is the case with Seoul’s Samgaksan (Bukhansan). It has a structure in which both sides are gneiss and the middle is granite, and so it forms very sharp, pointed mountains.
The vicinity of Jiksan, however, has the opposite structure. The granite side is low and forms valleys, while the gneiss instead forms high mountains. And the granite of this region is mostly weathered and crumbled, forming a sandy terrain, so it is naturally distributed along the valleys.
For example, both sides of the Anseong River (安城川) are granite zones, while the Saryeonsan (四連山, apparently referring to Seonggeosan and the mountains in its vicinity) near Jiksan is likewise a mountain range composed entirely of gneiss.
Also, if you cross the mountains toward Jincheon, there too the valley side is granite and the high places are gneiss terrain, which can be said to be exactly the opposite structure from the vicinity of Seoul mentioned earlier.
As for where the ore veins (鑛脈) of Jiksan exist, most are distributed in the contact zone between gneiss and granite. Some are within the granite and some are on the gneiss side, but in places where there is only gneiss or only granite, there are no ore veins. They are always concentrated at the boundary where the two rocks meet.
In Jiksan, numerous quartz veins (石英脈) are found at the foot of the gneiss-zone mountains that extend from Saryeonsan toward Anseong, where they come into contact with granite. Among these quartz veins are some that contain gold, and in particular, at a place called Bodeogwon (保德院)(translator’s note: present-day Dorim-ri, Ipjang-myeon, Cheonan City), excellent gold ore was mined. It was ore of superior quality, rarely seen even within Japan.
Quartz veins are also distributed here and there at the foot of Saryeonsan, and among these are some that contain gold to a greater or lesser degree. At Songwon (松原) in Seonghwan and near the old Sino-Japanese War battlefield, several quartz veins were also found, and among them some contained gold and some did not.
Also, near Songpo (ソンボ) (present-day Seongpo-dong, Ansan City), just before departure we newly discovered one ore vein and mined it quite a bit.
The gneiss zone continues as far as the Cheonan direction, and Cheonan is also a region that produces a great deal of gold. There are many mines here, and geologically too this region is likewise a contact zone of gneiss and granite.
In particular, it is presumed that there are many ore veins throughout the Jincheon-gun and Mokcheon-gun areas, and they are in fact regions where gold is produced. However, places where a gold vein has been definitely confirmed are still few, but it is said that a great deal of placer gold is found in the rivers.
To sum up, Saryeonsan is entirely a gneiss zone, granite is in contact at its foot, and quartz veins are concentrated in that contact zone, some of which are gold-bearing veins.
The region spanning from Jiksan to Anseong has long been a famous gold-mining zone, and even among Joseon people there was a saying, “South of Seoul, Jiksan is the place where the most gold is produced.” This area was also said to be called by the nickname “Geumsan (金山, Gold Mountain).” This is also the reason it became a target of the Japanese demand.
According to an official of the Joseon Imperial Household Department, there was even a story that the gold vein continued for more than 40 ri eastward from this Jiksan gold mine. Of course, whether that is true is unknown, but given that the gneiss mountains of this area come into contact with granite here and there, and that ore veins are scattered in those contact zones, the conjecture that gold is in fact distributed in various places is entirely plausible.
During my stay at the site, I confirmed ore veins at a total of 7 to 8 locations, and among them were some richly containing gold and some not.
Generally, good ore contained gold in proportions of about 1 part in 1,000 to 1 part in 2,000, and some contained trace amounts of gold on the order of 1 part in 10,000, 1 part in 100,000, or even 1 part in 1,000,000.
The type of ore was mostly quartz veins, and some were ore veins in the form of weathered clay, and in such places the gold content was, on the contrary, often higher.
I also searched for ore veins at several places after entering the Anseong-gun area. However, the magistrate of Anseong-gun at the time was a man named Yun Ung-ryeol (尹雄烈) (translator’s note: father of Yun Chi-ho; great-granduncle of Yun Bo-seon; awarded the title of baron for his services in the Japan-Korea annexation). He was the younger brother of the Joseon Minister of the Army at the time, and his ancestors’ graves are said to have been in this region (Anseong).
So he advanced the following logic:
“To mine gold in Anseong is the same as the act of digging up one’s ancestors’ graves.”
For this reason, when Japanese tried to prospect for or develop a gold mine in Anseong, he threatened to behead or imprison the Joseon person who guided them. Because of such circumstances, the gold-vein deposits of this region could not be sufficiently surveyed.
Nevertheless, I confirmed the locations of ore veins in 2 to 3 places, and among them were some that yielded ore of considerably good quality.
In this way, the Jiksan gold mine is also a very interesting place geologically. The ore veins actually discovered are scattered across many locations, the terrain is flat, and transport is convenient. In particular, once the Gyeongbu Railway opens, it will be equipped with excellent transportation infrastructure both at sea and on land, so it can be called an extremely promising region as a site for Japanese business activity.
Also, I have heard that the Busan–Daegu section and the Seoul–Asan section of the Gyeongbu Railway are to be built first, while the Asan–Daegu section has been pushed to a lower priority. As I see it, however, this very middle section will become the most profitable line.
Anseong, as the central market of the region south of Gyeonggi, is a relay point through which a great deal of goods passes toward the Gangwon Province side, and goods going south by way of the Pungdo sea area also pass through here. Therefore this line is a section that can be expected to have considerable traffic volume.
Also, Songpo (ソンボ) is already even now thriving as a market where rice and various goods gather, and once the Gyeongbu Line opens it will surely become an important unloading point.
To add, the fact that this Jiksan gold mine is adjacent to Asan, Seonghwan, and Pungdo—the sites of fierce battles during the Sino-Japanese War—also gives it historical significance. For that reason, I think there would be value in touring this area as a historic site as well.
Today I ask for your understanding that I have given only a rough explanation.
Journal of Geography (Chigaku Zasshi)
1901 Volume 13 Issue 6 323-332
Published: June 15, 1901
Released on J-STAGE: October 13, 2010
DOI https://doi.org/10.5026/jgeography.13.323
261pp On the Jiksan Gold Mine in Korea https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jgeography1889/13/5/13_5_261/_pdf/-char/en
323pp On the Jiksan Gold Mine https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jgeography1889/13/6/13_6_323/_pdf/-char/en
Reference
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